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Letter dated 9 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to the letter dated 13 June 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to you (A/61/956-S/2007/362), I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded from 6 June to 31 July 2007.

On 6 June 2007, four F-16 and three CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 7 June 2007, four Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 8 June 2007, four F-16 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 9 and 10 June 2007, two Cougar, two C-130, two C-160 and one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type, violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 12 June 2007, five CN-235 and five Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations 10 times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus nine times.

On 13 June 2007, two CN-235, two B-200, two F-16, two F-4 and nine Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations 13 times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus 12 times.

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On 14 June 2007, four CN-235, three Cougar and four F-16 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations eight times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus seven times.

On 19 June 2007, one Cougar, one CN-235 and four F-16 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 20 June 2007, two C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 21 June 2007, four F-16, three CN-235 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 23 June 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 26 June 2007, four F-16, two Cougar and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations five times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 27 June 2007, two B-200 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 28 June 2007, two F-16, two F-4, two CN-235 and four Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 30 June 2007, four C-130 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 2 July 2007, two Cougar and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 3 July 2007, two F-16, two F-4 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice.

On 4 July 2007, two C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 5 July 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 9 July 2007, two F-16 two F-4, one Cougar and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 10 July 2007, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 11 July 2007, two B-200 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 13 July 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 16 July 2007, one CN-235, two Cougar and two MI-8 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations five times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 17 July 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 18 July 2007, two F-16, two F-4, three CN-235 and two C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 19 July 2007, 17 NF-5, one C-130, one C-160, one B-200 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 20 and 21 July 2007, 17 NF-5, two Cougar, two Cessna and one Dornier Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus seven times.

On 23 July 2007, four F-16 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 24 July 2007, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 25 July 2007, two B-200 and two C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 29 July 2007, two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 30 July 2007, two F-16, two F-4, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 31 July 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I would like to strongly protest the aforementioned violations and hereby appeal for their immediate cessation. Turkey's policy of non-observance of established rules and regulations governing international aviation gravely jeopardizes flight safety in the Eastern Mediterranean.

These provocative and irresponsible actions by Turkey, in conjunction with the recently pursued Turkish policy of regional hegemony, which covets the maritime resources of the Republic of Cyprus, present a serious destabilizing factor and generate tension in the region. Such policies and actions provide ample demonstration of the irresponsible behaviour of a country that otherwise aspires to assume a non-permanent seat on the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas **Hadjichrysanthou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of France on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 13 July 2007 by the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, stating that Mr. Jean-Maurice Ripert has been appointed representative of France on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 1756 (2007), and the statements by its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular on 23 July 2007,

Reaffirming its commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region,

Welcoming the establishment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of democratically elected institutions, and *reaffirming* the sovereign authority of the elected government to establish effective security and control throughout the national territory,

Taking note with satisfaction of the adoption of the programme of the Government, in particular the governance contract included therein,

Taking note of the final report (S/2007/423) of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to resolution 1698 (2006),

Condemning the continuing illicit flow of weapons within and into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *declaring* its determination to continue close monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493 (2003) and expanded by resolution 1596 (2005), and to enforce the measures provided for in resolution 1596 against persons and entities acting in violation of this embargo, as amended and expanded by resolutions 1649 (2005) and resolution 1698, and recognizing the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa,

Recalling its resolution 1612 (2005) and its previous resolutions on children and armed conflict, and once again strongly condemning the continued recruitment and use of children in violation of applicable international law, in the hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Reiterating its serious concern regarding the presence of armed groups and militias in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri district, which perpetuate a climate of insecurity in the whole region,

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Taking note of the report of the Security Council mission which visited Kinshasa on 20 June 2007 (S/2007/421),

Recalling the importance of urgently carrying out security sector reform and of disarming, demobilizing, resettling or repatriating, as appropriate, and reintegrating Congolese and foreign armed groups for the long-term stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 15 February 2008 the measures on arms imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493 as amended and expanded by paragraph 1 of resolution 1596;

2. *Reaffirms* paragraph 21 of resolution 1493 and paragraph 2 of resolution 1596, and *recalls* in particular that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to supplies of arms and related materiel or technical training and assistance intended solely for support of or use by units of the army and police of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, provided that the said units:

(a) Have completed the process of their integration, or

(b) Operate under the command, respectively, of the état-major intégré of the Armed Forces or of the National Police of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or

(c) Are in the process of their integration, in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo outside the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri district;

3. *Decides* further that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to technical training and assistance agreed to by the Government and intended solely for support of units of the army and police of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are in the process of their integration in the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri district;

4. *Decides that the conditions specified* in paragraph 4 of resolution 1596, as now applied to the Government, shall apply to supplies of arms and related materiel as well as technical training and assistance which are consistent with such exemptions noted in paragraph 2 and 3 above and notes in this regard that States have an obligation to notify such supplies in advance to the Committee referred to in paragraph 7;

5. *Decides to renew*, for the period specified in paragraph 1 above, the measures on transport imposed by paragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of resolution 1596;

6. *Decides* to renew, for the period specified in paragraph 1 above the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596, paragraph 2 of resolution 1649, and paragraph 13 of resolution 1698, and reaffirms the provisions of paragraph 14 and 16 of resolution 1596, and paragraph 3 of resolution 1698;

7. *Recalls* the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1533 (2004), as expanded pursuant to paragraph 18 of

resolution 1596, paragraph 4 of resolution 1649 and paragraph 14 of resolution 1698;

8. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those of the region, to support the implementation of the arms embargo and to cooperate fully with the Committee in carrying out its mandate;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to re-establish for a period expiring on 15 February 2008 the Group of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1533 and expanded pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 1596;

10. *Requests* the Group of Experts to fulfil its mandate as defined in paragraph 5 and 17 of resolution 1698, to update the Committee on its work as appropriate, and to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, by 15 January 2008;

11. *Requests* MONUC, within its existing capabilities and without prejudice to the performance of its current mandate, and the Group of Experts referred to in paragraph 9 above to continue to focus their monitoring activities in North and South Kivu and in Ituri;

12. *Reaffirms its demand*, expressed in paragraph 19 of resolution 1596, that all parties and all States cooperate fully with the work of the Group of Experts, and that they ensure:

– the safety of its members,

– unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

13. *Further demands* that all parties and all States ensure the cooperation with the Group of Experts of individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control, and calls on all States in the region to implement fully their obligations under paragraph 12 above;

14. *Decides* that, no later than 15 February 2008, it shall review the measures set forth in paragraphs 1, 5 and 6 above, with a view to adjusting them, as appropriate, in the light of consolidation of the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular progress in security sector reform including the integration of the armed forces and the reform of the national police, and in disarming, demobilizing, resettling or repatriating, as appropriate, and reintegrating Congolese and foreign armed groups;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Letter dated 8 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 8 August 2007, addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-45663 (E) 140807

Annex to the letter dated 8 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the letter of the Greek Cypriot representative addressed to you dated 22 June 2007 and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/61/964-S/2007/377).

In the face of the misrepresentations and distortions contained in the aforementioned letter of the Greek Cypriot representative, I deem it necessary to draw your kind attention to the following.

First and foremost, I wish to point out that the cleaning up of old, vacant and partly derelict buildings in Karpas region has been carried out in accordance with the legal duty and responsibility of the Ministry of Interior in creating a safer, more hygienic and healthier environment for all residents living in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In this respect, all buildings that constitute threat to the public safety are identified and cleaning-up is carried out. Our relevant authorities have identified 280 derelict buildings as well as ruins in this region, some of which were merely single-roomed stables and haylofts. All work that has been done so far has been implemented for the sole purpose of public safety and the owners of such properties included both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. It should also be noted that this work is carried out not only in Karpas region but throughout the whole of Northern Cyprus where it is required.

Our study has revealed that some of the owners of such properties in the said region have permanently left the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with their families. It should be noted that all foreigners, including Greek Cypriots residing in the North, who take permanent residence elsewhere have the option of transferring their properties to people of their choosing within one year of their departure. Should the owner of the property decide not to exercise this right, such property, by law, is deemed abandoned and becomes public property. The owners of such property are still eligible to apply to the Immovable Property Commission for an assessment of their abandoned properties in the North and to claim redress through the options available before the Commission, including restitution, exchange and/or compensation.

The relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have worked diligently to contact the immediate families of the deceased owners of properties that were in an imminent state of collapse. Those buildings creating a severe threat to public safety were demolished after due notice was given to the immediate family or any other relative residing in the North.

I also wish to add that some of the heirs who claim to have inherited these properties have been unable to produce any documentation of proof to this date. The heirs, within a year of the death of their relatives residing in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, should start the necessary procedures for acquiring property rights for the estates. Otherwise, their properties will be declared as abandoned and considered as public property. Similarly, after the expiration of the one-year period, the heirs can file an application to the Immovable Property Commission where they will be provided with an appropriate redress in accordance with the law.

It is unfortunate that the Greek Cypriot administration is misrepresenting and exploiting, for political propaganda purposes, a routine clean-up process required by law and carried out for the safety of all residents of the Karpas area, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike. As is the case elsewhere, it is the responsibility of the relevant authorities of our state to ensure that people residing in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus live in a safe and healthy environment. At the same time, property owners who feel particularly aggrieved by the action of the relevant authorities have a number of legal remedies available in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus whereby they can claim damages for the action taken by the authorities.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Letter dated 8 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 8 August 2007 addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki İlkin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 8 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to our letter dated 2 February 2007 (A/61/727-S/2007/54, annex), I am writing to bring to your kind attention once again the continuing provocative policies of the Greek Cypriot administration, which undermine stability in the island, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration to delimit maritime jurisdiction areas and explore oil and natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean are being carried out at the expense of legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriot people. The Greek Cypriot administration does not represent the entire island. It neither has the legal right nor the legitimacy to claim to represent or act on behalf of Turkish Cypriots who have their own elected representatives and live under their own administration.

It is most unfortunate that the Greek Cypriot administration pursues such policies in complete disregard of the facts that the Turkish Cypriot people are the equal partners under the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and, as such, have an equal right and say on the natural resources on the land and sea areas of the island of Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot side attempts to create a fait accompli by finalizing, in mid-August, the tender process it initiated for the 13 oil exploration fields unilaterally defined in the area. On various occasions, it was made abundantly clear by the Turkish Cypriot side that such unilateral acts are totally unacceptable. We witness, with regret, that the Greek Cypriot side continues to take such steps which undermine the prospect for a settlement in the island.

The expectation of the Turkish Cypriot side, as well as the international community, from the Greek Cypriot leadership is not to take steps generating further tension in the region while efforts are under way to find a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. Such a settlement, among other things, will enable Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to jointly benefit from the island's resources.

As clearly mentioned in our above-mentioned letter dated 2 February 2007, any agreement signed and step taken on the matter by the Greek Cypriot administration under its purported capacity as the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" is null and void and is not in any way binding on the Turkish Cypriot people or the island as a whole.

In concluding, I would like to reiterate our firm commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem under your good offices mission and on the basis of the United Nations Comprehensive Settlement Plan.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic

I. Introduction

1. In my report of 23 February 2007 on Chad and the Central African Republic (S/2007/97), submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006), I submitted proposals with regard to the possible mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multidimensional United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. The report envisaged the deployment of a United Nations mission comprising international military and police elements, as well as civil affairs, human rights and other civilian components.

2. Those recommendations were made with a view to addressing instability along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and the threat posed to the safety of civilian populations, including, in particular, refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as the conduct of humanitarian activities in the area.

3. In Chad, the aim of those proposals was for the United Nations to contribute to the improvement of the security situation by supporting national law enforcement activities in 12 major refugee camps in eastern Chad and internally displaced person sites in the vicinity of key towns in the eastern part of the country.

4. The proposals called for a Chadian and United Nations police presence to be complemented by the deployment of a mobile and well-equipped military force, which would be capable of taking robust action to protect civilians at risk, deter conflict, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reduce tension and contribute to the establishment of a more secure environment in its area of operation. The force would also provide wide-area security, which is a prerequisite for the deployment of a police presence.

5. Although the Chadian authorities agreed, in principle, to the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations presence to eastern Chad, President Déby and his Government expressed concerns relating to the military component of the proposed United Nations mission.

6. On 23 March, the Security Council held informal discussions with the Chadian Minister for External Relations, Ahmad Allam-Mi, who presented an alternative model for an international presence. The Chadian proposal was significantly

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different from the options recommended in my report of 23 February (S/2007/97) and did not include a United Nations military component. Nevertheless, during his discussion with the Council, Mr. Allam-Mi stressed that the Chadian Government's position was not "final" and that it remained open to discussions.

7. I therefore dispatched a United Nations delegation, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to Chad and the Central African Republic, in order to consult with the authorities of both countries, clarify the options contained in S/2007/97 and consult with relevant stakeholders on the ground.

8. In addition to providing a brief update on relevant developments in Chad and the Central African Republic, the present report summarizes the activities of the United Nations delegation and describes a revised concept for a United Nations mission in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.

II. Update on recent developments

A. Chad

9. Since the issuance of my last report (S/2007/97), there have been some positive developments in Chad and in the region. On 8 February 2007 the Government of Chad initiated the inter-Chadian dialogue with members of the political opposition. Although no definitive conclusions have been reached to date, a number of areas of agreement were identified, including with regard to the electoral law, the status of the national electoral commission, the conduct of a national and electoral census and civil and political rights. The armed opposition groups did not join the dialogue, reportedly objecting to the Government's insistence that they disarm and confirm their recognition of the authority of President Déby and his Government in order to participate.

10. On 4 March 2007 a new Government was appointed under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouradine Delwa Kassiré Koumakoyé, a political opposition figure. In another conciliatory move, Mahamat Nour, the former leader of the Front uni pour le changement, who signed a peace agreement with President Déby on 24 December 2004, was appointed Minister of Defence.

11. At the regional level, representatives of Chad, Eritrea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Sudan met in Khartoum on 1 and 2 May to follow up on the four-party peace summit that was convened in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 21 February 2007 under the auspices of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). At the meeting in May participants agreed to deploy eight observers to 10 locations on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, with protection for each team provided by Chadian and Sudanese forces. The implementation of these security arrangements had not been confirmed at the time of the writing of the present report.

12. On 3 May a separate agreement to strengthen and develop relations between Chad and the Sudan was signed in Riyadh, under the auspices of King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the Government of Chad reportedly directed Sudanese rebel groups to leave Chadian territory.

13. With regard to the security situation, the Government lifted the state of emergency on 26 May 2007. Since the issuance of S/2007/97, clashes between

Government troops and rebel forces have been occurring only sporadically. The main cause of insecurity for civilian populations is now widespread criminality and banditry and an associated breakdown in law and order.

14. That insecurity continues to have a direct impact on humanitarian assistance efforts. While the number of Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad has stabilized at about 236,000, related to a reduction in large-scale attacks on Sudanese civilians near the border with Chad, the number of internally displaced persons continues to rise, as a result of ongoing insecurity within Chad, and is now in excess of 170,000 — an increase of nearly 80,000 since December 2006. This has severely strained local coping mechanisms and limited the movement of humanitarian organizations, impeding their ability to deliver assistance.

15. In the meantime, the Government of Chad has not identified suitable alternative sites for refugee camps close to the Sudanese border, particularly Oure Cassoni and Am Nabak camps, which Sudanese rebel groups have been using for recruiting and other purposes. Efforts to find sustainable sites should continue, since doing so would make it easier to preserve their civilian and humanitarian character while also removing potential flashpoints in the border area.

B. Central African Republic

16. Since the issuance of my last report, President Bozizé has continued to express his support for inclusive political dialogue; he has also indicated that improved security is a precondition for such an initiative. Meanwhile, following the meeting of 2 February between President Bozizé and rebel groups in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Government and the rebel group Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) engaged in direct talks during February and March, which eventually led to a peace agreement on 13 April.

17. Before that agreement was reached, however, UFDR forces attacked Birao on 3 and 4 March, causing the temporary withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) from the town and forcing most of the 14,000 inhabitants to flee. According to reports from the humanitarian community, over 700 houses were burned, many of them intentionally.

18. FACA subsequently forced UFDR out of Birao, with support from French forces and the subregional Multinational Force (FOMUC) of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. French forces have since deployed a company to Birao to strengthen the two FACA infantry companies stationed there, and this "security bubble" has facilitated the return of most of those who fled.

19. The north-eastern Central African Republic, where there are currently 30,000 internally displaced persons, has also been destabilized by events originating in Darfur. Towards the end of May, an influx of 2,500 Sudanese refugees from the village of Daffak, South Darfur, sought refuge in the Central African town of Sam Oudandja. The refugees were reported to have suffered heavy casualties as they fled an attack by armed men, whom they described as Janjaweed and who were allegedly supported by Sudanese military aircraft.

20. The security situation in the north-western Central African Republic, where 180,000 people are internally displaced, also continues to be a cause for serious concern. This was underscored by the tragic killing on 11 June 2007 of a staff

member of the international humanitarian organization Médecins sans frontières by the members of the rebel group Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie.

III. United Nations delegation to Chad and the Central African Republic: summary of activities

21. The United Nations delegation visited Chad and the Central African Republic from 21 May to 25 June 2007. In N'Djamena it held consultations with the Chadian authorities, the diplomatic community, the United Nations country team, humanitarian organizations and the African Union. Consultations were also held with Chadian authorities and humanitarian workers in Abéché and Goz Beida, in eastern Chad.

22. From 18 to 21 June, the United Nations delegation undertook a visit to the Central African Republic and held discussions in Bangui with President Bozizé and other Government representatives, the diplomatic community, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the United Nations country team and FOMUC. The delegation also visited Birao.

23. During the delegation's visit to Chad, Government representatives expressed a desire for the prompt deployment of a civilian United Nations mission, as a first step towards addressing urgent security concerns, particularly with respect to the refugee camps in eastern Chad. They also indicated that a United Nations military presence was not favoured by the Chadian Government, although it could eventually be discussed as a second phase of a United Nations deployment.

24. It should be recalled, however, that the two technical assessments previously conducted by the United Nations in Chad confirmed that a police presence could function only in combination with a complementary military presence, which would contribute to the protection of civilians and establish the wide-area security required for police activities to be carried out effectively.

25. Meanwhile, on 10 June, President Déby met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Bernard Kouchner, to discuss the situation in eastern Chad. The United Nations delegation was subsequently informed by the Minister for External Relations of Chad that following discussions with Mr. Kouchner the President had agreed, in principle, to the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad composed of French and other European Union forces.

26. That proposal was further discussed on 25 June at the expanded Contact Group meeting in Paris, which took note of President Déby's acceptance, in principle, of the deployment of an international presence to eastern Chad. Subsequently, on 23 July, the European Union Council of Ministers also welcomed the proposal, noting its support for the deployment of a United Nations multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. The Council of Ministers further asked its competent bodies to continue planning with a view to a possible decision on a bridging operation, in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

27. Meanwhile, the head of the United Nations delegation met with President Bozizé, who reiterated his appeal for a strong international commitment in support

of the efforts of the Central African Republic to bring peace and stability to the country. He also confirmed his request for a peacekeeping presence to be deployed in the north-eastern part of the country, in order to secure the tri-border area in conjunction with FACA, and underlined that insecurity in Vakaga prefecture was directly linked to the conflict in Darfur.

28. On the basis of the foregoing, and as a result of subsequent consultations with the European Union and the French Government, the United Nations has developed a revised concept for a multidimensional international presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.

IV. Multidimensional United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic

A. Revised concept

29. The revised concept includes three significant adjustments to the proposals made in my report of 23 February. First, the tasks and functions of the military component, which are required for the effective functioning of the international presence, would be performed by a European Union military force that has been accepted by President Déby. This arrangement would be in place for a period of 12 months from the time of the deployment of the force, subsequent to which an appropriate follow-on arrangement, including a possible United Nations successor operation, would be put in place.

30. Follow-on arrangements would be determined on the basis of a joint assessment of requirements by the United Nations and the European Union, and would be undertaken six months after the deployment of the European Union and United Nations components of the multidimensional international presence described below. In this respect, it will be essential to secure the early consent of the Chadian Government to the deployment of a possible follow-on force. A capable and appropriately configured military component would play a fundamental role in efforts to improve security and is a requirement for the deployment and effective functioning of an international police presence.

31. In a second major adjustment to the proposals made in my last report, there would be no direct involvement of the multidimensional international presence in the border area.

32. In a third adjustment to my initial proposal, Chadian police and gendarmes selected to maintain law and order in the refugee camps and internally displaced person sites would continue to serve under national authority. However, they would be trained, monitored and mentored by the United Nations police component and provided with direct logistical support from the United Nations.

33. One of the distinguishing features of this new concept is that it calls for the deployment of an operation, authorized by the United Nations, with three distinct elements. The first is a multidimensional United Nations presence comprising civilian staff, including in the areas of civil affairs, human rights, rule of law and mission support, as well as United Nations police and a number of United Nations military liaison officers.

34. The second element is a Chadian police component, made up of police officers and gendarmes who would be screened, selected, trained and supported logistically and materially by the United Nations presence. This special Chadian police contingent would be established exclusively to maintain law and order in the refugee camps, key towns and surrounding areas associated with concentrations of internally displaced persons and humanitarian activities in the eastern part of Chad.

35. The third and final element would be the European Union military force, which has been accepted in principle by President Déby and which would, inter alia, assist in protecting civilians at risk, including internally displaced persons and refugees, within its capabilities, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. This force would also provide the wide-area security that is a prerequisite for the deployment of a police presence.

B. Mandate

36. The principal objective of the multidimensional international presence authorized by the United Nations would be to contribute to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian populations at risk in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. In doing so it would work in coordination with the United Nations country team to carry out the following tasks in the areas of security, the protection of civilians, human rights and the rule of law:

Security and protection of civilians

(a) Assist in protecting civilians at risk, including refugees and internally displaced persons, within the capabilities of the United Nations-mandated operation and in its areas of deployment;

(b) Select, train, advise and provide support to special Chadian law enforcement elements, which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in the refugee camps, internally displaced person sites and key towns in the surrounding areas and assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad;

(c) Liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie, the police force, judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic;

(d) Facilitate the provision and free movement of humanitarian assistance by contributing to an improvement in security within the area of operations;

(e) Liaise with the Government of Chad and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps in close proximity to the border, including with regard to the provision of logistical support for the relocation of such camps;

(f) Take all necessary measures to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

(g) Liaise closely with the Government of the Sudan, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations

hybrid operation, BONUCA and CEN-SAD to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;

(h) Promote, in close cooperation with United Nations agencies, local reconciliation and social cohesion through community-based social and economic recovery in the area of operations;

Human rights and the rule of law

(i) Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights by monitoring, documenting and reporting on violations in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic;

(j) Conduct preliminary investigations in cases of major human rights violations in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and recommend corrective action to relevant actors;

(k) Support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of local authorities and civil society through training in international human rights standards;

(l) Assist the Government in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system in close coordination with United Nations agencies.

C. Area of operations

37. The area of operations of the mission would be eastern Chad, specifically the Ennedi Est department and the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat regions, and the north-eastern Central African Republic, including the Vakaga prefecture and the north-eastern part of Haute-Kotto prefecture.

D. Mission structure

38. The United Nations-authorized presence in Chad and the Central African Republic would be a multidimensional operation comprising a range of components, including the special Chadian law enforcement element, United Nations elements, comprising police, substantive and Mission support staff, and the military force made up of European Union troops. The overall presence would be coordinated by a United Nations-appointed head of mission, who would serve as my Special Representative for Chad and be responsible for coordinating the peacekeeping mandate in the north-eastern Central African Republic. In this regard, my Special Representative would have authority over all United Nations entities in the field, providing overall management and policy guidance and coordinating all United Nations activities throughout the area of operations, in accordance with established United Nations policy.

39. My Special Representative and a small number of key staff would be based at the mission's headquarters in N'Djamena. This group would include military and police liaison officers to carry out critical liaison with the European Union force and

Chadian police and gendarmes operating within the framework of the United Nations-mandated activities.

40. The majority of mission personnel, including the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, would be based in eastern Chad. In this regard, a forward headquarters would be established in Abéché; it would include a dedicated coordination mechanism, staffed by United Nations civilian, military and police personnel, Chadian police and gendarme personnel and liaison officers from the European Union force.

41. In order to cover the large territory in eastern Chad, three multidimensional field offices would be established, in Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida, each with a dedicated liaison capacity. With regard to the Central African Republic, a liaison office in Bangui would be established and would work closely with BONUCA, with a forward office in Birao.

42. The United Nations Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator for Chad would be a member of the mission's senior management team, while retaining, in accordance with standard practice, his or her reporting lines to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the United Nations Development Programme Administrator.

E. Component activities

Political and civil affairs

43. A small political component would provide support and advice to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the performance of his or her tasks and would monitor and provide analysis on major political, security and administrative developments. This component would also be responsible for reporting to United Nations Headquarters.

44. A civil affairs component would liaise with local authorities and civil society in the areas of deployment, to ensure a constructive relationship between stakeholders and the United Nations-mandated presence, including through exchange of information, confidence-building and community projects. Civil affairs officers would also promote and support good governance and reconciliation initiatives and would coordinate this work with the United Nations country team and other international stakeholders. The civil affairs component would focus primarily on field locations in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic; it would also have a liaison presence in N'Djamena and Bangui.

Military

45. Without prejudice to the final planning that would be conducted by the United Nations and the European Union, the military component of the multidimensional international presence would adopt the broad concept and contain the capabilities set out below, in order to perform the tasks described above.

46. In eastern Chad, the military component would assist in protecting civilians at risk, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief and seek through its presence to reduce tension and deter conflict, with a view to establishing a more secure environment in its area of deployment. The force would provide security coverage for United Nations personnel deployed in the area of operation, including civilian

staff and United Nations police elements, with an initial focus on the Dar Sila department of south-eastern Chad. In the Central African Republic, the military component would also play a significant role in deterring the movement of armed groups between the Sudan and Chad through the Central African Republic.

47. To perform the tasks described above, a framework of infantry battalion groups would be deployed to provide a robust and effective presence on the ground by conducting land and air patrols, in the daytime and at night, in order to reassure the civilian population and deter attacks against them. The provision of wide-area security would also help expand the zone in which humanitarian actors could safely operate.

48. The force should possess ground elements capable of long-range patrols. The battalion groups and their supporting aviation should be equipped for night operations. In order to identify emerging threats, the force should also possess or be supported by the necessary surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. To achieve an early effect on the ground, the rapid deployment of a significant military element with engineer, medical support and other enabling capabilities would be required, initially in the areas containing a large presence of vulnerable populations.

49. The force should be authorized to take necessary action, supported by appropriate rules of engagement, and be equipped to respond robustly to any hostile action and to undertake deterrent and protection operations.

50. The force element would be headquartered, or have at least a coordination and liaison office, in N'Djamena, while its military operations would be controlled from a forward operational headquarters in Abéché co-located with the United Nations forward Headquarters to ensure full coordination and maximize the integration of operations. Three sectors, also co-located with the United Nations, would preferably be established in eastern Chad, with headquarters in Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida; and one sector would be established in the north-eastern Central African Republic, with its headquarters in Birao.

51. In addition to military advisers who would be based in N'Djamena to support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, military coordination and liaison officers would be deployed to Brussels, and also to the operational headquarters of the European Union military component, to ensure effective cooperation with the European Union force.

52. Static protection for United Nations facilities, as well as a certain number of dedicated military support units, will be an essential aspect of the military deployment. These could be provided by the self-sustaining units of the European Union military presence, if the force co-locates with United Nations elements. Any alternative would have financial and operational implications for the United Nations deployment.

53. Military liaison with all relevant stakeholders, especially the armed forces of Chad and the Central African Republic, would be critical to ensure an understanding of, and respect for, the character of the force operating under United Nations mandate. Close liaison with AMIS, the future hybrid operation and the CEN-SAD observation elements should also be established for exchange of information on potential threats developing on either side of the border, in order to provide early warning.

Police

54. The overall objective of the police component of the United Nations-mandated presence would be to enhance the capabilities of Chadian police and gendarmes to provide effective police service to the populations in eastern Chad affected by the crisis, in particular refugees, internally displaced persons and the local population, as well as humanitarian workers.

55. Building on the experience gained by the Government of Chad and UNHCR, the United Nations would assist the Government in establishing a special law enforcement element dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps and associated areas. This proposed element could be known as the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire and would be composed of approximately 850 Chadian police and gendarmes who would be selected, trained, advised, mentored and monitored by United Nations police. Members of the service would be distinguished from other national police personnel by a special uniform and accoutrements.

56. A memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Chad would clearly delineate the law enforcement responsibilities of the Chadian element and the monitoring, advisory and support role of the United Nations.

57. The Government of Chad would nominate candidates from its national police and national gendarmerie for service in the new unit. The United Nations would evaluate those candidates against criteria to be agreed in the memorandum of understanding and would have final authority over the selection. The United Nations would also establish accountability mechanisms according to internationally accepted standards.

58. It is envisaged that the current arrangement in place between the Government of Chad and UNHCR would eventually be replaced by the new proposal described in the present report. Service in the UNHCR programme will be taken into consideration when candidates are screened by the United Nations.

59. Selected candidates would undergo comprehensive predeployment training to upgrade their police expertise, acquaint them with the special needs of the affected populations and ensure that they understand their responsibility to respect internationally accepted criminal justice and human rights norms and standards.

60. The United Nations would provide, directly or through international partners, a broad range of support for the special national police element, including by upgrading or refurbishing essential facilities in affected areas and by providing basic accommodation, rations, vehicles and communications equipment required for the new police entity to perform its functions. In addition, the United Nations would facilitate, through collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donors, the provision of basic police equipment, such as sidearms, uniforms, boots, belts, handcuffs and batons. Members of the national element would also receive a stipend, based on local scales and paid by the United Nations for the duration of their service in this special unit. The mission would also provide assistance to Chadian law enforcement agencies and ministries to allow them to build administrative and other capacities necessary to support the special gendarmes elements.

61. A United Nations police component would comprise up to 300 officers who would focus primarily on training, mentoring and advising members of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire, and monitor their performance to ensure that they adhere to national law and internationally recognized criminal justice norms and standards. The United Nations would have the authority to remove from the programme any member of the new police corps whose performance was considered unsatisfactory.

62. There may also be a requirement for the United Nations to directly support Chadian capacity to maintain public order in the areas described below. This requirement could be addressed through the deployment of a number of United Nations formed police units. In addition, a robust air mobility capacity would be required for police operations.

63. Once deployed, the special Chadian element would assume exclusive law enforcement responsibility in carefully defined jurisdictions, centred on refugee camps and surrounding concentrations of internally displaced persons and associated towns. Responsibilities would include patrolling, investigation of criminal activity and arrest of offenders. Its jurisdictions would include refugee camps and their surrounding areas (a radius of approximately 10 kilometres will be envisaged); the key towns that serve as bases for humanitarian agencies and are closely associated with the relief effort (at present such towns are almost completely neglected by national law enforcement); humanitarian access routes between towns and camps; and areas hosting internally displaced populations.

64. There would be six special jurisdiction operational zones in which the Chadian element would function: Abéché (the largest town in eastern Chad, which serves as the headquarters for the humanitarian effort) and the five key towns associated with the refugee camps — Bahai, Iriba, Guéréda, Farchana and Goz Beida. These zones and the responsibilities of the national police element would be clearly defined in the memorandum of understanding. Existing national agencies would retain law enforcement responsibility in the affected region outside the areas of jurisdiction of the special element.

65. The commissioner of the United Nations police component and a small command group would direct the police activity of the mission from the United Nations headquarters in N'Djamena. The induction of international personnel and the selection and training of national personnel for the Chadian element would also be conducted in the capital. The main centre for operations, administration and logistics would be the United Nations operational headquarters in Abéché.

66. The Chadian element would be centred on six operational commands, called stations, which would be located in the key towns: Abéché, Bahai, Farchana, Goz Beida, Guéréda and Iriba. The stations would have responsibility for policing key towns, patrolling humanitarian access routes between key towns and refugee camps and providing security for humanitarian staff and facilities. Corresponding to the 12 UNHCR-run refugee camps in eastern Chad, 12 special Chadian-element police posts would report to the stations. The United Nations standing police capacity would be responsible for the start-up of the United Nations police component of the Mission.

67. This police concept could be implemented only in combination with a military presence, which would provide the wide-area security required by all aspects of the United Nations-mandated mission.

68. In the Central African Republic, a police liaison presence would be deployed to Bangui, to provide a link to key stakeholders, including the Government, BONUCA and international agencies.

Human rights

69. The human rights component would carry out human rights monitoring, investigation, reporting and training activities. Particular attention would be paid to the identification of violators of human rights and to the thematic areas of sexual violence and child protection. Human rights officers would be deployed throughout the mission area and work in close collaboration with other components, including military, police, judicial, corrections and other civilian components, as well as United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other humanitarian actors on the ground to proactively identify potential threats to the civilian population. Human rights officers would also participate in joint analysis with other components of the Mission in order to help establish operational priorities. Regular public reports on the human rights situation in the mandated areas of deployment would be issued, with specific recommendations for corrective action by relevant actors.

70. The human rights component would also work in collaboration with the United Nations country team and other actors on activities aimed at strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights. Particular attention would be given to working jointly with the police component of the international multidimensional presence to promote adherence to human rights principles and practices of democratic policing by the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire. This would include ensuring that human rights considerations are reflected in the screening and selection of the Chadian gendarmes for that police corps and integrated into training and sensitization programmes for the national police and gendarmes.

Rule of law

71. The rule of law component would work closely with all stakeholders to support the strengthening of essential legislative, judicial and correctional institutions by providing offices, advice and technical assistance. The component would support national actors in strengthening the independence, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary and enhance the fairness and effectiveness of the legal system in accordance with national legal traditions and cultures and international norms.

72. If the breakdown in law and order and the culture of impunity in eastern Chad are to be addressed effectively, the formal justice system and the prison system must both be strengthened. A complement of up to 25 seconded corrections officers and an appropriate number of judicial officers would be required to advise and support Chadian authorities to that end. Those officers would be deployed to the same key towns as the United Nations police component. The mission would also coordinate its activities with ongoing programmes aimed at improving access to justice that the Government is implementing with the support of the United Nations country team and the European Commission.

Humanitarian liaison and coordination

73. Ongoing humanitarian operations in Chad and the Central African Republic would continue to be coordinated by the respective United Nations Humanitarian Coordinators. While this activity would take place separately from the work of the mission, the Humanitarian Coordinators would advise the head of mission on humanitarian matters in the mission area and would participate in the mission's senior management to that end. In addition, a number of humanitarian liaison officers would be deployed as part of the mission, to be based primarily in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to ensure appropriate liaison between the mission, the United Nations country teams and the broader humanitarian community in those areas.

Public information

74. As I indicated in my last report, an effective public information component would be crucial to ensure widespread understanding of the purpose, objectives and activities of the mission. This would be accomplished through the wide dissemination of messages describing the work of the mission, which would target the populations living in the border areas covered by the mission, as well as key stakeholders, including specific communities in the area of operations and the national armed forces. The public information component would also develop and disseminate messages focusing on reconciliation and the importance of peace and stability. To accomplish these tasks, the component should have a capacity for public outreach and media relations and for print and radio production.

Gender

75. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the mission would ensure that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its work. A key objective would be to facilitate capacity-building support for both uniformed and civilian elements in the Mission on gender-mainstreaming strategies. Technical support and advice would be provided to all Mission components so that they could respond adequately to the identified priorities of women and girls in the sectors of security, protection and human rights.

76. Working in collaboration with the human rights component, the gender component would develop a gender action plan specifically targeted at eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. The plan would focus on prevention and response measures to address the high rate of reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence against the civilian population, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Addressing HIV/AIDS prevention would also be emphasized.

Conduct and discipline

77. A personnel conduct and discipline unit would be established within the mission to support my Special Representative in developing strategies and mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The unit would work in collaboration with other components and offices of the mission to put in place awareness-raising and training activities to prevent misconduct, establish networks of focal points to receive complaints and establish related data-management and monitoring systems required

to carry out this work. The mission would also establish capacity for the investigation of allegations of misconduct in accordance with established rules and procedures.

HIV/AIDS

78. As reflected in my last report, HIV prevalence in both Chad and the Central African Republic is high. Further to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the mission would provide ongoing HIV/AIDS awareness and sensitization programmes for all mission personnel, uniformed and civilian, including access to voluntary HIV counselling and testing in all areas of deployment. The HIV unit would collaborate with the United Nations country teams and civil society organizations to integrate HIV concerns into the mandate of the mission, in particular the need to protect vulnerable populations from sexual and gender-based violence and to raise HIV awareness among refugees and internally displaced persons.

Staff safety and security

79. In the light of the complex requirements for staff security in the mission area, particularly in eastern Chad, a staff security coordination mechanism would be established in eastern Chad to ensure cooperation among organizations with security capacities in order to promote the existence of a safe and secure environment for mandate implementation and programme delivery activities. This mechanism would be essential, given the current United Nations security phase III and IV environment, and the different regional security requirements and threats. In the Central African Republic, existing staff safety and security mechanisms would be augmented in the north-eastern part of the country, in anticipation of an increase in personnel in that region.

Mine action

80. Although it is estimated that the landmine threat is fairly low in eastern Chad, and particularly along the border with the Central African Republic, the confirmed presence of explosive remnants of war poses the threat that landmines could disrupt the activities of the mission. In this regard, a mine action unit would assess and verify all routes to be used by the mission, the United Nations and the humanitarian agencies as safe for traffic. There would be a requirement to deploy a mine survey and explosive ordnance disposal capacity (two teams) to undertake the initial clearance work required to support the work of the Mission.

Mission support

81. The mission support component of the United Nations presence would establish, operate and maintain the infrastructure, essential communications, mobility and sustainment capabilities required by the United Nations operation to carry out its responsibilities. The landlocked nature of both Chad and the Central African Republic, as well as their harsh environmental conditions, scarcity of resources and minimal infrastructure, would considerably complicate the deployment of the United Nations. Considering, in addition, the number of humanitarian personnel operating in eastern Chad, there is a clear risk of exhausting currently available natural resources. Any deployment would therefore need to be closely coordinated with the European Union security presence, the United Nations

country teams and other stakeholders working in the areas concerned to assess its impact on the local communities.

82. At the start-up of the mission, there will be substantial requirements for the establishment of work areas, living space, information technology and security arrangements. The expeditious establishment of these facilities will likely require significant use of a multi-purpose logistics support capability, ideally provided on a bilateral basis by a single donor, while United Nations commercial contracts would be procured for longer-term mission sustainment. Support for United Nations police and military formed units operating outside of N'Djamena would follow United Nations standards for self-sustainment. Chadian gendarmes and police under the special-elements programme would be sustained through separate arrangements.

83. Logistical support would optimally be channelled into Chad and the Central African Republic through the two main corridors: from Douala in Cameroon and, to a limited extent, from Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In addition, it is important to stress that the rainy season in the area of operations will limit the possibility of bringing in required equipment by road. In this regard, the early pre-positioning of strategic deployment stocks to N'Djamena would be essential.

V. Observations and recommendations

84. The humanitarian situation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic has shown no signs of improving since the issuance of my last report. In addition to the 236,000 refugees and 170,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad, there are also an estimated 700,000 people in host communities who are directly affected by instability and sporadic violence in the region. In the Central African Republic the sudden influx of Sudanese refugees into the Vakaga prefecture in early May provided a clear and unsettling illustration of the instability in that remote section of the country. In these circumstances it is more important than ever to address the insecurity that has forced so many people in these border areas to flee their homes in fear for their lives.

85. The revised concept for an international multidimensional presence described in the present report represents a unique opportunity to improve the security of those civilian populations and to contribute to the creation of an environment where humanitarian organizations can carry out their critical work.

86. The revised concept also addresses the misgivings of the Chadian authorities with regard to the presence of a United Nations military component in the eastern part of the country, without sacrificing the fundamental requirement for a military deployment to provide the wide-area security that is required to protect the civilian population and to allow the police and other elements of an international presence to effectively perform their tasks.

87. For this new approach to be developed successfully, the United Nations, the European Union and the Chadian authorities will have to coordinate very closely, beginning in the planning stages. To that end, regular and informal working-level contacts have been initiated between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and European Union planners. Subject to the decision of the Security Council, this cooperation would have to intensify in order to ensure compatibility of approach, since the European Union military component would have to be designed to take

into account police, mission support and civilian aspects of the United Nations multidimensional presence.

88. Collaboration with Chadian authorities will also be essential. In this context, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has dispatched personnel from its standing police capacity team to N'Djamena for further discussions with their Chadian counterparts.

89. Should the proposals contained in the present report be approved, it would be extremely important to make provisions for robust and effective liaison and coordination mechanisms in N'Djamena and Abéché, and also in New York and Brussels, as appropriate. In Chad, these coordination mechanisms would be supported logistically by the United Nations so that the multidimensional United Nations presence, the European Union force and the special Chadian law enforcement unit of gendarmes work together smoothly.

90. The proposals made in the present report should also be seen in the context of rapidly evolving events in Darfur, and in particular the acceptance by the Government of the Sudan of the heavy support package and the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation. In this regard, I welcome Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) and would like to reaffirm my intention to move expeditiously with its implementation. The two deployments — one in Darfur and the other in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic — would have a material impact on the security situation in the region, which would have to be considered and monitored closely. Progress on the political track in Darfur will also have an impact, since it would likely lead to increased stability in Darfur and the possibility of an eventual return home of Sudanese refugees currently in Chad and the Central African Republic.

91. The deployment of a United Nations-mandated multidimensional international presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic could have a significant positive impact on the security situation there. It is nevertheless important to stress that, as in the Sudan, a lasting solution to the crises in the region can be achieved only through political agreements. Such agreements are possible only if the leaders and Governments of those three countries marshal the political will to engage in serious dialogue and provide an opportunity for legitimate grievances to be addressed. As I stressed in S/2007/97, the international community has a central role to play in emphasizing that lasting peace will be achieved only through dialogue and reconciliation.

92. Even as these efforts are pursued, all possible steps should be taken to protect refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities from the violence and victimization that threaten them daily. In this regard, I recommend that the Security Council signal its intention to authorize the establishment of the proposed multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, along the lines envisaged in the present report. In the meantime, United Nations and European Union planning would be taken forward with a view to providing the Council with specific details of the proposed international multidimensional presence in the coming weeks.

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Letter dated 10 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour of writing to you in your capacity as the President of the Security Council for the month of August 2007, and would like to request your kind assistance in circulating, as a document of the Security Council, the report of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission to Georgia regarding the bombing of the territory of Georgia on 6 August 2007.

(*Signed*) Irakli **Chikovani**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

07-45695 (E) 130807

Annex to the letter dated 10 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Mission to Georgia

Spot report

Topic: Tsitelubani missile incident

Date: 8 August 2007

Summary

A guided missile impacted in the area of the Georgian administered village of Tsitelubani in the south-eastern part of the zone of conflict without causing causalities or major damage. A joint JPKF/OSCE monitoring team was deployed in the early morning of 7 August to examine the site. The Georgian authorities accused the Russian Federation of violation of the Georgian-Russian State border, intrusion into Georgian airspace and the bombing of Georgian territory by Russian military aircraft. The Russian authorities in turn denied any involvement. **End of summary**

Narrative

At around 04:00 on the morning of 7 August, the Mission was informed by the Georgian authorities that a missile impact site was found near the Georgian administered village of Tsitelubani, in the south-eastern part of the zone of conflict close to the main east-west highway (M27). According to the Georgian authorities, the impact was linked to the alleged violation of Georgian airspace by Russian SU-type aircraft, which crossed into Georgian airspace and dropped the missile before returning into Russian airspace again.

It was agreed that a joint JPKF/OSCE monitoring team (JMT) would be deployed to the site early in the morning. The Chief Monitoring Officer of the Mission arrived at the spot from Tbilisi at approximately 07:00, and the JMT at around 08:30. The Georgian Interior Minister, the Head of the Georgian Air Force, the Chief of Shida Kartli Police and many other officials as well as some press officers were already present at the site.

The JMT examined the site and took photographs of the missile parts. The missile was identified as a guided missile approximately 3 metres in length and 40 centimetres in diameter. It was assessed that the warhead had not detonated on impact.

The JMT was shown a radar printout by Georgian officials that indicated a track entering the area from the north-east and then exiting the same way. From the printout the aircraft was assumed to be a single aircraft but there was also an opinion held by some Georgian representatives on the ground that two aircraft might have been involved. The radar printout showed that aircraft entered and exited Georgian airspace in the area close to the town of Stepantsminda (formerly Kazbegi) at 14:31 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and 14:41 GMT respectively (local time is GMT plus 4 hours), flying at an altitude of approximately 3,700 metres.

The JMT could not definitely identify the missile type at that stage, and neither the type or number of aircraft.

The JMT was then asked to exit the cordoned area as the Georgian engineers wanted to recover more of the missile. The JPKF Commander who was at the site gave a short interview to the press. At approximately 12:35 the Georgian engineers invited the JMT to examine the recovered central section of the missile and more photographs were taken.

In relation to this incident, at the JPKF morning briefing of 7 August, information was passed by the Chief of Staff of the Russian battalion of the JPKF, who chaired the meeting, that two nearby JPKF Observation Posts (OP) manned by personnel of the North Ossetian battalion (at Didi Gromi and Tsinagari) reported over-flights. The Didi Gromi OP, 12 kilometres north-north-west of Tsitelubani, reported an aircraft flying from south-west to north-east and reported seeing a missile launched towards the north. It was also stated that the approximate altitude of the aircraft was 3,000 metres. The Tsinagari OP, 4 kilometres north-north-east of Tsitelubani, reported hearing a missile impact to the north of their OP but nothing else.

At 13:00, the JMT was sent to check these OPs and left the impact site. At the Tsinagari OP, the OP commander and other personnel stated that on 6 August, at 18:40 to 18:45 local time, they had observed one aircraft flying from north-east to south-west at an altitude of about 3 kilometres. Before the aircraft reached the OP, it reportedly launched a rocket. It then turned and flew back to the north-east. The same information was given at the Didi Gromi OP. The only difference was that the JPKF personnel there reportedly heard and saw the launch of a rocket right above their OP. The JMT also went to the Ossetian administered village of Kvemo-Zakhori, 4 kilometres north-east of Didi Gromi. Villagers there confirmed the details of the over-flight as reported by the two JPKF OPs and also confirmed the rocket launch to the south of the village.

In the early morning of 8 August, the JPKF Commander decided to send another JMT to the area around the impact site to gather more eyewitness accounts related to the incident.

Other developments

On the same day, 7 August, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Georgia was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Georgian side, according to a statement posted on the Ministry's website, "expressed a firm protest over the violation of the Georgian-Russian State border, intrusion into Georgian airspace and the bombing of the Georgian territory by Russian military aircraft on 6 August 2007 and assessed this act as undisguised aggression and gross violation of sovereignty of the country". The statement continued that at the meeting the Georgian side categorically demanded clear and immediate explanations from the Russian side.

Representatives of the Russian authorities the same day ruled out any involvement in this incident and stated, among other things, that no aircraft from the Russian Air Force made any flights in the area at the time in question, and that no trespassing over the border into Georgia took place. The Russian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs expressed extreme concern about the incident and called for a thorough and speedy investigation.

Later in the day, the Mission attended a briefing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this incident for the diplomatic corps. The Acting Head of Mission went together with other representatives of the diplomatic corps to the impact site at Tsitelubani, where an additional briefing in the presence of President Saakashvili took place. The Georgian President called on the international community to respond adequately to the incident.

The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Miguel Angel Moratinos, expressed his deepest concern over the incident in a statement issued on 7 August.

Photo of the shown radar track at the impact site

Map of approximate location of impact point

Photo of the impact site

Photo of central section of missile

Photo of part of the missile engine



United Nations S/2007/490

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 August 2007
English
Original: French

Letter dated 10 August 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005) and 1722 (2006), I have the honour to convey the attached letter from the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, dated 20 July 2007 (see annex), transmitting the tenth report on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, covering the period from 1 March to 31 May 2007.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-45786 (E) 150807 150807

Annex

Letter dated 20 July 2007 from the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005) and 1722 (2006), I attach the tenth three-monthly report on the activities of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) (see enclosure). The report covers the period from 1 March to 31 May 2007. I would be grateful if you would transmit the attached report to the President of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Javier **Solana**

Enclosure

Report of the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report covers the period 1 March 2007 to 31 May 2007.

2. The Security Council, in its resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005) and 1722 (2006), requested that Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the European Union, report to the Council on the activity of the European Union military mission (EUFOR) through the appropriate channels and at least at three-monthly intervals. This document is the tenth such report to the Council.

II. Political background

3. During the reporting period, the general security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained stable. However, the political situation deteriorated, mainly as a result of the International Court of Justice ruling of 26 February in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia. The verdict sparked strong reactions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including calls for a special status for Srebrenica outside the Republika Srpska.

4. Despite facilitation efforts by the Special Representative of the European Union and a visit by European Union Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn in mid-March, the political parties were unable to reach agreement on police reform, thereby preventing the initialling of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union. The text of the Stabilization and Association Agreement was finalized at the end of 2006 and can be initialled as soon as the political preconditions are met.

5. There was no concrete progress on constitutional reform during the reporting period. Constitutional reform was frequently discussed by political leaders in combination with other reform issues but no agreement was reached.

III. EUFOR activities

6. On 27 February 2007, the European Union decided to transform EUFOR. EUFOR attained full operational capability of the new structure on 28 April. The new structure is based on a headquarters in Sarajevo, a situational awareness matrix (including liaison and observation teams spread throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina) and a manoeuvre element, which can be reinforced, if necessary, by over-the-horizon reserves. EUFOR's reconfigured force numbers some 2,500 troops, from 24 member States of the European Union and 9 third countries.[a]

[a] EUFOR currently comprises troops from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and Albania, Argentina, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. Cyprus and Malta contribute to the common costs of the operation.

7. EUFOR continues to conduct operations in line with its mandate to provide deterrence, to ensure continued compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace, annexes 1A and 2, and to contribute to a safe and secure environment.

8. On 7 May, EUFOR, upon request from the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, conducted an operation against the home of Vojislav Topalovic, a suspected member of the Karadžić support network. His home was raided and a number of items were seized for further analysis and investigation. The operation was supported by the State Intelligence Protection Agency (SIPA), the State-level Bosnian police agency.

9. On 31 May, the Republika Srpska police arrested Zdravko Tolimir, a war crime suspect indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. At the request of the Tribunal, EUFOR transported Tolimir from Banja Luka to Sarajevo, and provided a security escort and medical support.

IV. Outlook

10. Having completed its reconfiguration, EUFOR continues to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

United Nations S/2007/491

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 August 2007

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 13 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. Jeffrey DeLaurentis has been appointed alternate representative of the United States on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

07-45995 (E) 150807

United Nations S/2007/492

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 August 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 13 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter from Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, to the Secretary-General.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the enclosed letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zahir **Tanin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-45898 (E) 150807

Annex to the letter dated 13 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

5 August 2007

On behalf of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan I have the honour to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the role played by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), authorized under Security Council resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 and subsequent resolutions, for the wider contribution that the United Nations is making towards security and stability in Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force led by NATO since August 2003 has been crucial in improving security initially in Kabul, and through its programme of phased expansion in the north, west, south and east of the country, which is very important, has played a key role.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan welcomes the proposal that ISAF should continue to operate in Afghanistan until the security forces are fully able to provide security to our nation. The Government of Afghanistan is grateful to all those nations contributing resources to ISAF and to those nations that have assumed a leadership role.

I hope the Security Council will continue to reflect in its resolutions the paramount importance of fulfilling the ISAF mandate.

(*Signed*) Dr. Rangin Dadfar **Spanta**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2007/493

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 August 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 13 August 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letters addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations on 16 and 23 April 2007 (S/2007/215 and S/2007/232 respectively), as well as the note verbale dated 10 April 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (A/61/848), and their annexes, I have the honour to state that the contents of the said documents regarding the Iranian islands of Abu-Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb are totally baseless and void of any legal value. The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the groundless claims of the United Arab Emirates regarding those Iranian islands and reiterates that the islands are integral and eternal parts of the Iranian territory.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be of the view that constructive and positive negotiations between the Iranian Government and the relevant officials of the United Arab Emirates will lead to the expansion of bilateral relations between the two countries in various fields, and will help to remove any misunderstanding between the two countries with regard to the implementation of the 1971 memorandum of understanding between Iran and Sharja about the Iranian island of Abu-Musa.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-46001 (E) 160807

United Nations S/2007/494

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 August 2007
English
Original: French

Letter dated 15 August 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a communication dated 10 August 2007 which I received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this communication to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-46133 (E) 210807 210807

Annex

Letter dated 10 August 2007 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), I attach a report on operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from February to April 2007 (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Jaap **de Hoop Scheffer**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the United Nations on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. By resolution 1510 (2003), the Security Council requested the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide reports on the implementation of its mandate. This is the thirteenth such report by NATO and it covers the period from February to April 2007.

2. On 29 April 2007, ISAF had 34,348 personnel from 28 NATO countries and 1,445 from 11 non-NATO countries.

Operational review

3. In this reporting period, ISAF has successfully pre-empted Taliban spring offensive operations by disrupting insurgent activity and command and control. The security situation has thus allowed continued maintenance and growth of projects, such as the Kajaki Dam.

4. Throughout the winter, Operation Oqab has continued along the Pakistan border area in an attempt to deny insurgents safe havens and prevent them from reconstituting operations and supply lines.

5. Operation Nowruz began on 21 March 2007 on a nationwide scale. This is an overarching framework operation, involving Afghan and ISAF forces building on the success of Operation Oqab in setting conditions for economic recovery. It is intended to extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan, inhibit the ability of opposing military forces to conduct operations, and provide the security necessary to allow reconstruction and development.

6. Operation Achilles in early March saw the Afghan National Security Forces operate in the Sangin Valley and throughout Helmand province in order to improve the security and stability in the southern part of Afghanistan. Setting conditions for sustained economic development will include creating jobs and providing economic development opportunities for Afghans, increasing hydroelectric output and increasing irrigation. Despite high threat levels in the area, President Karzai visited the area of operation in late March, demonstrating the Government's commitment to making Operation Achilles a success.

7. Overall, the winter period saw the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF successfully conducting operations that prevented the Taliban from launching a coordinated offensive over the spring. The momentum achieved will be maintained in order to continue to push for establishment and consolidation of Afghan development zones in the most volatile southern and eastern regions of the country.

Security situation

8. Opposing militant forces activity was concentrated in the south and east during the reporting period, with isolated attacks increasing as the weather improved over spring. Opposing militant forces tactics are based on low risk, high impact improvised explosive device attacks supported by robust propaganda efforts designed to undermine the credibility of ISAF and the Government. Opposing

militant forces attack levels are roughly twice as high as over the same reporting period in 2006. This increase is due to opposing militant forces initiative but also to the higher level of Afghan National Security Forces-ISAF activity throughout the country.

9. In the Regional Command Capital, for which Turkey took over command on 7 April, the decrease in attacks noted in the previous report continued in the early part of this reporting period. The relative quiet continued until March when there were a string of improvised explosive devices, including suicide attacks. Kabul remains the centre of gravity of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community and as such it is a prime target. Despite the low level of popular support for the opposing militant forces in Kabul itself, attacks are likely to continue.

10. In Regional Command North, there has been an increase in attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF. Attacks on international organizations and NGO personnel are also noted although rare. Most of these attacks are thought to be criminally motivated, although opposing militant forces involvement is not ruled out. Attacks focus on lines of communication.

11. In Regional Command West, the situation has been generally calm. Southern Heart and Farah provinces remain the major security concerns. In Farah, the opposing militant forces continued to conduct roadside attacks against Afghan National Police (ANP) checkpoints over the reporting period. The opposing militant forces focus here as well is against the lines of communication.

12. In Regional Command South, less affected by the weather, the situation remained volatile during the entire winter. Opposing militant forces have maintained varying, sometimes elevated, levels of attacks. Higher levels of attacks in this region are attributable primarily to ISAF operations in the area, like Operation Achilles, and the importance opposing militant forces place on retaining freedom of movement in the region, defending strongholds and exploiting any tactical opportunity. The opposing militant forces seemed to avoid direct engagements and preferred indirect attacks. Additionally, the opposing militant forces strategy included countering Government/ISAF reconstruction and development efforts, such as the Kajaki Dam, in order to retain and expand their influence in the area.

13. In Regional Command East, the opposing militant forces attacks have increased as the weather improved. Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom forces conducted several combined operations in early spring with little in the way of opposing militant forces response. Opposing militant forces are most active in Kunar province, where they seek to retain their freedom of movement and access to safe havens. In Nangahar province, popular support for the Government and ISAF has been damaged by civilian casualties and poppy eradication efforts. Some suicide attacks have taken place and small-scale harassment is also noted. Opposing militant forces activity is also reported in Ghazni, Logar and Laghman provinces along the main lines of communication. Opposing militant forces are likely to continue their aggressive propaganda campaign and intimidation of the local population.

Afghan National Army

14. Although lagging behind benchmarks towards the agreed 70,000 figure, Afghan National Army assigned manpower continued to increase steadily as duty presence increased by 20 per cent since the last reporting period. In terms of

equipment, the winterization programme implemented by the United States of America Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan also resulted in steady growth. Afghan National Army training saw the implementation of the Red-Yellow-Green training and operation cycle, allowing for two thirds of the corps soldiers to be available for operations. This cycle allows for down time for Afghan National Army soldiers and provides focused training cycles for manoeuvre units. Absence without leave levels are thus expected to be reduced. The Afghan National Army air corps is conducting requalification training of pilots, with the support of ISAF and the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan.

Afghan National Police

15. Afghan National Police development is lagging behind compared to the targets presented to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. Greater international assistance in this field is essential. The International Police Coordination Board secretariat was established to provide such assistance in March 2007. The European Union also launched the 195 personnel European Police Mission to Afghanistan in June.

16. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police programme is nearing the end of its first year of training in priority provinces. Significant irregularities in the vetting process were revealed and need to be corrected. Overall, the programme is successfully developing and as of 25 March, approximately 4,700 Afghan National Auxiliary Police graduated and were deployed to facilitate Afghan National Police operations as well as in support to the Afghan National Army.

17. The Afghan National Civil Order Police is a newly formed force that will eventually grow to a total of 5,000. The Afghan National Civil Order Police is due to replace the Afghan Standby Police and will act as a quick reaction force at the provincial level. Finally, a Special Police Unit will be set up to focus on counter-terrorism and organized crime.

Judicial reform and rule of law

18. From an ISAF perspective, there needs to be an enhanced coordination and cohesion of international efforts in the areas of judicial reform and the rule of law. Efforts are mainly concentrated in Kabul. In view of the lack of progress at the regional level, ISAF is embedding rule of law and justice reform into its legal architecture. ISAF has undertaken a nationwide survey of the situation, seeking data in every area related to judicial reform.

19. The Attorney General's anti-corruption efforts remain scattered and unfocused, usually based on unsubstantiated allegations. Military-driven efforts have yielded some achievements in terms of launching the survey. Regional Command East is especially proactive in planning five provincial justice conferences. This local approach will allow ISAF to continue its drive in partnership with Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan to promote coordination.

Counter narcotics

20. There have been modest improvements in the capacity of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics to tackle the drugs trade. In particular, provincial capacity remains weak, although the recent change in leadership at the Ministry may lead to

a revitalized and refocused Afghan counter-narcotics effort. However, endemic corruption remains and this limits the effective implementation of the counter-narcotics strategy. There is also much evidence to suggest interference in the eradication process.

21. The Government of Afghanistan ruled out ground-based spraying for 2007 and eradication was only conducted using manual and mechanical methods. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported an eradication total of 19,901 hectares (ha) (as at 10 June), including an eradication of 3,000 ha conducted in Helmand by the centrally directed Afghan Eradication Force. In most provinces where eradication occurred, it was conducted by Governor-led programmes but with varying degrees of success. The Governors of Kandahar and Nangahar have achieved significant levels of eradication, while others have not. There have also been allegations of corruption made against eradication forces and associated officials again in 2007.

22. While ISAF is not directly involved in eradication operations, the security threats presented by the drugs trade, including links between opposing militant forces and the trade are evident. Consequently, ISAF is working to maximize its support to counter-narcotics operations, in accordance with the provisions of the Operational Plan.

Disbandment of illegal armed groups

23. The efforts at disbandment of illegal armed groups have seen disappointing levels of weapons-collection activities. The lack of political and practical support for the disbandment of illegal armed groups is the main factor for this trend. Also one can attribute this to the increased level of insurgency and the Government's inability to demonstrate its resolve against uncooperative illegal armed groups. Nonetheless, a number of positive results have been noted. Following the President's endorsement of the disbandment of illegal armed groups strategy review in 2006, a revised action plan was approved in February 2006. This action plan focuses on the strategic level and highlights a number of issues, such as Government support, appropriate legislation and ministerial coordination, as well as the formal establishment of an effective enforcement capability.

Peace and reconciliation programme

24. The peace strengthening and reconciliation programme (Takhim-e-Sol), led by Professor Mujadeddi, is being maintained despite funding problems. It aims to provide socio-economic support to reconciled individuals and is being developed in cooperation with the international community and Government ministries and the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan. Eleven field offices have now been established of which three have been opened in the south. The number of reconciled individuals had risen to approximately 3,300 by the end of March, compared to 2,600 at the end of November 2006.

Neighbouring countries

25. ISAF has continued to work with the Government of Afghanistan in contacts with neighbouring countries, primarily through the Tripartite Commission, which aims to improve military cooperation on border security, intelligence sharing and counter-improvised explosive device work.

26. Efforts to initiate collaborative planning between Afghan and Pakistan military have been met with some promising success. On a number of occasions, military-to-military coordination has occurred on border issues. In addition, military structures have been developed in Kabul, allowing Afghan and Pakistani officers to work together on a daily basis.

27. In early 2007, the Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Ankara, at the invitation of the President of Turkey, to enhance various aspects of the cooperation between their countries and consequently agreed on the Ankara Declaration.

Governance

28. Internal Government coordination remains relatively poor, with limited consistency in messages from the Government and a lack of synchronization between ministries. The recently established National Communications Coordination Centre aims to improve this and weekly themes are being passed to ministries through the Policy Action Group. However, much work needs to be done so that consistent messages are sent by the Government to the population.

Development

29. Development within Afghanistan remains difficult to assess. While there is substantial funding available, the inability of the provincial leadership to produce development plans in accordance with the interim Afghan National Development Strategy requirements remains a concern. ISAF continues to play a role through the provincial reconstruction teams in providing support and advice at the local level.

United Nations

A/ES-10/396–S/2007/495

General Assembly
Security Council

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15 August 2007

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 15 August 2007 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to you today to express, once again, our grave concern about the increasingly deteriorating situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of Israel's grave breaches of international humanitarian law against the Palestinian people. Such actions come at a time when expressed political statements from the Israeli side have painted a deceptive picture of peace promotion and mutual respect.

The Israeli occupying forces continue to carry out incursions into Palestinian towns and neighbourhoods across the West Bank and Gaza Strip, wreaking havoc and spreading destruction and death among the civilian population. In the pre-dawn hours of yesterday, 14 August 2007, Israeli tanks and bulldozers charged into the Gaza Strip, waging a large-scale operation against the town of Abasan in Khan Younis in the south, and Beit Lahia in the north. During these incursions, Israeli occupying forces killed seven Palestinians, including a 60-year-old woman, along with her son and grandson, and injured 25 others. Moreover, almost 100 Palestinians were also illegally detained and subjected to humiliating treatment and stripped of their most basic rights. Also, today, 15 August 2007, Israeli occupying forces stormed the city of Nablus in the West Bank, laying siege to entire neighbourhoods and arresting a number of residents.

Aside from the daily illegal detention campaigns of Palestinians, Israel, the occupying Power, also continues to hold almost 11,000 Palestinians in its prisons and detention centres, including 45 elected officials. Palestinian detainees are subjected to appalling treatment, humiliation and torture, in grave violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Just yesterday, Israeli prison authorities violently assaulted detainees in Nafha Prison, using special forces and dogs to attack the prison cells and to physically abuse the detainees and strip search them.

07-46121 (E) 160807

Israel, the occupying Power, also extends its grave breaches of Palestinian rights to the Palestinian people's holy sites. On Monday, 13 August 2007, Israeli occupying forces sealed off the Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil and prevented Muslim worshippers from praying inside. In this regard, we note that all recent reports, including those issued by Israeli human rights organizations, have concluded that Israeli occupying forces are exercising an ethnic cleansing policy against Palestinians in Al-Khalil with the aim of vacating its original inhabitants from the city by implementing a series of illegal measures. These measures have choked the economic and social life out of this historic Palestinian city and allowed extremist Israeli settlers to wreak havoc in the city and attack its Palestinian residents and their property on a daily basis.

The international community, including the Palestinian people, look forward to the upcoming international conference, and hopes that such a conference proves beneficial to the promotion of the cause of peace. However, as clearly expressed by the Palestinian leadership, concrete confidence-building and peace-promoting measures must be taken in preparation of this conference. Rather than building bridges of confidence and peace, Israel, the occupying Power, continues to take aggressive and illegal measures that deepen mistrust and increase animosity between our peoples.

Israel, the occupying Power, will only continue to deliberately commit its systematic human rights violations as long as it continues to believe it can act against the Palestinian people under its occupation with impunity. The international community, in accordance with the rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law, has clear responsibilities in terms of ensuring the proper conduct of the occupying Power, including compliance with its legal obligations and commitments, and we continue to express our strongest hopes that the necessary measures will be taken in this regard.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 291 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 6 August 2007 (A/ES-10/395-S/2007/475), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

In follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my profound regret to inform you that the number of Palestinian civilians that have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces since September 2000 now totals 4,638 people. (The names of the martyrs identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 August 2007 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (from Friday, 3 August 2007, to Tuesday, 14 August 2007)

Friday, 3 August 2007

1. Ra'ed Abu al-Adass

Saturday, 4 August 2007

2. Hisham al-Jamal

Sunday, 5 August 2007

3. Medhat Ahmad al-Halabi

Monday, 6 August 2007

4. Mohammad Oraib al-Malloukh

Wednesday, 8 August 2007

5. Ikrami Abu Amsha
6. Mohammad Subhi al-Batneeji (19)
7. Fadi Fawwaz Arqeeq

Tuesday, 14 August 2007

8. Ahmad Kamal al-Qarra
9. Mus'ab Abu Jamei'
10. Sabha al-Qarra (60)
11. Omar Mohammad al-Qarra
12. Mohammad Youssef Abu Musameh
13. Ibrahim al-Shami
14. Bassam al-Daghma

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 4,638.

United Nations S/2007/496

Security Council

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16 August 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 14 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, during the Presidency of the Republic of the Congo, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the subject: "Maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa".

The Republic of the Congo has prepared a concept paper to help guide the discussion on that occasion (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Pascal **Gayama**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-46228 (E) 170807 170807

Annex to the letter dated 14 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]

Open debate of the Security Council on conflict prevention and resolution, particularly in Africa

Terms of reference

On 28 August 2007, the Security Council will hold an open debate to consider how to enhance the effectiveness of the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, particularly in Africa.

I. Context and objectives

1.1 The Security Council, in its resolution 1625 (2005), expressed its determination to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in preventing armed conflicts and to monitor closely situations of potential armed conflict.

1.2 In the same resolution, it stressed the importance of establishing effective comprehensive strategies of conflict prevention, focused on averting negative developments in the security, economic, social and humanitarian sectors and in the field of governance and human rights in countries which are facing crises. To that end, resolution 1625 (2005) requested the Secretary-General "to assist countries at risk of armed conflict in performing strategic conflict risk assessments, in implementing the measures agreed by the concerned countries, in enhancing national dispute management capacities, and in addressing the root causes of armed conflict".

1.3 During its Presidency, the Congolese delegation wishes to launch a debate on enhancing the Organization's capacity in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa. This debate is intended to promote a comprehensive strategy for conflict prevention and resolution that will take advantage of existing international, regional or subregional mechanisms and will strengthen coherence in the actions of all actors in the field of conflict prevention.

1.4 The Secretary-General, in his report (A/60/891) urges comprehensive action which includes three approaches:

(a) structural prevention to address sources of conflict while preventing crises from breaking out or recurring;

(b) operational prevention that, in the case of immediate crisis, makes use of early warning, good offices, response to humanitarian needs, protection of civilians and sanctions;

(c) systematic prevention, a new approach intended to minimize the risk of conflict escalation.

1.5 Several thematic debates recently begun by the Security Council have helped to enrich the discussion, both through the innovative nature of the topics addressed

and the relevance of the observations made. Since the beginning of 2007, the Security Council has held a series of meetings that shed new light on the causes of conflicts and the new challenges the world must face in the area of peace and security. Noteworthy among these meetings are:

- The open debate on threats to international peace and security on 8 January 2007 (S/PRST/2007/1);
- The open debate on security sector reform on 20 February 2007 (S/PRST/2007/3);
- The open debate on security, energy resources and climate change on 17 April 2007;
- The open debate on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security on 28 March 2007 (S/PRST/2007/7);
- The open debate on natural resources and conflict on 25 June 2007 (S/PRST/2007/22).

1.6 On the subject of cooperation with regional organizations, in particular the African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted on 16 June 2007 a joint communiqué which called for strengthening of relations between the two bodies, particularly on conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, including post-conflict reconstruction and development, as well as sharing of information on conflict situations.

1.7 The African Union Summit Meeting held from 22 to 30 January 2007 in Addis Ababa recalled that the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council and called on the United Nations to examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the possibility of funding, through assessed contributions, peacekeeping operations undertaken by the African Union or under its authority and with the consent of the United Nations.

1.8 In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the Heads of State and Government encouraged and supported the initiatives being taken by the African Union and African subregional organizations to prevent, mediate or resolve conflicts, with the assistance of the United Nations.

II. Justifications

2.1 Too often the Security Council has stressed reaction to conflict rather than prevention. The persistence of conflicts on the Council's agenda and their recurrence calls for innovative initiatives to find solutions better suited to current circumstances. A comprehensive approach therefore appears necessary if a long-term resolution is to be found for grave crises affecting the stability of certain parts of the world, particularly Africa. This necessitates coherence among national, regional and international policies and mechanisms.

2.2 In 2006, United Nations expenditures over the previous five years for peacekeeping operations were calculated at $18 billion. Likewise, international

organizations, non-governmental organizations and various associations devote significant financial resources to reducing tensions, social crises and various evils caused by armed conflict, while a policy of prevention would allow substantial savings.

2.3 Recently the Security Council has been promoting the development of such new bodies as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. However, mobilization of social actors and the ability to meet the expectations of all stakeholders remains limited and would gain from encouragement in order to capitalize on their contributions to the areas of peace and stability.

2.4 It is also true that the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly are making great efforts to promote the Millennium Development Goals. Greater coherence and complementarity of actions between those bodies and the Security Council are more necessary than ever in determining the root causes of conflicts, if the desired progress is to be made within the time limits for the implementation of those Goals.

2.5 The African Union is acting with increasing frequency on behalf of the international community, the United Nations in particular, in many conflict situations in Africa. Its capacity to take effective action in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is limited by the lack of financial, material and human resources.

III. Points for discussion

3.1 How does the Security Council envisage implementation and follow-up of conflict prevention and resolution efforts? The following points could be considered:

(a) The role of the Security Council in the area of institutionalization of conflict prevention in the United Nations system: the United Nations Secretariat, in close collaboration with regional organizations, should be prepared to advise on crucial issues (governance, wealth-sharing, economic arrangements, security and transitional justice arrangements) and should have the operational mechanisms required. In that context, the potential role of the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs, should be determined;

(b) Cooperation among the main bodies of the United Nations, in particular:

(i) The proposal made by the President of the Economic and Social Council in the open debate on natural resources and conflict to establish a forum between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council on that issue;

(ii) The proposal of the Secretary-General (A/60/891, para. 95) to transform the Group of Friends on conflict prevention into a formal forum;

(c) The operational modalities of cooperation between the Secretariat and the African Union Commission on issues that affect peace and security in Africa as well as the exchange of experience;

(d) The global and comprehensive strategic vision that must underlie the action of the United Nations in this area.

3.2 How to ensure that the regional organizations, including the African Union, which act on behalf of the international community, especially the United Nations, receive sustainable and predictable financing for the peacekeeping operations that they undertake?

3.3 In the context of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, how can the coherence and functionality of the existing regional and subregional African mechanisms be guaranteed:

(a) The Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, whose instruments must be activated as follows:

(i) The protocol on non-aggression and mutual defence;

(ii) The protocol on judicial cooperation;

(iii) The protocol on combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources;

(iv) The protocol on the restoration of democracy and good governance;

(b) The Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), an organ of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), established in 1999 under the auspices of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and which has the following instruments:

– Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1996;

– Mutual Assistance Pact;

– Early warning mechanism for Central Africa;

– Central African Multinational Force;

(c) Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (based in Yaoundé, Cameroon);

(d) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which has a key role in such sectors as:

– Programmes for cross-border security in the field of small arms control;

– Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes;

– Coordination of some joint activities of a number of subregional or international organizations;

(e) The United Nations Office for West Africa;

(f) The Memorandum of Understanding signed in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006 between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the African Union Commission (A/61/630, annex).

IV. Expected result

➢ Adoption of a statement by the President of the Security Council.

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the Congo on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 16 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations stating that Mr. René Nsemi has been appointed alternate representative of the Congo on the Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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